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Corruption is clearly associated with the power calculus in state spaces 
and societies floundering with no validating principles. It is what defines 











African state spaces, and by implication, the continental space, are suffused with 
corruption. Corruption actually defines 
the African state. Conservatively, 
not less than 70% of the summit of 
African leadership, in the Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary, is embroiled 
in corruption, in its material and non-
material expressions. Accordingly, 
Africa's paternalistic leadership and 
those close to their patrimonial circles 
constitute paralysing impediments 
to the actualisation of the fractious 
national will and the obscured common 
African will as well as the repressed 
continental good. Corruption is an 
emotionally and ideologically vested 
concept, and corruption research is 
often characterised and/or motivated 
by normative descriptions and analyses 
of corruption.1
Corruption is thus a complex 
phenomenon. It is an imprecise 
concept without a universally accepted 
definition. The varying definitions 
of corruption tend to reflect the 
inclination of the scholar2 and  are 
influenced by  a host of factors related 
to the use for which the concept is to 
be immediately adopted. 
In this article, corruption is 
the deployment of power, often 
legitimately acquired power, or use 
of one’s office or status in society, to 
promote or advance material and 
non-material interests and outcomes 
to private ends that are extraneous to, 
and with definitive deleterious impact 
on, or inconsistent with the overall 
objective public or common good. 
Accordingly, corruption is regarded as 
antithetical to the purpose of public 
administration. It is often referred 
to as a failure of the institution of 
the public service and as a betrayal 
of the essential professional ethic of 
the public administrator to serve the 
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public “honestly and disinterestedly as 
trustees of the public interest”.3 Public 
good or overall public interest are used 
synonymously and interchangeably as 
the non-exclusive common good.
The normative end of public 
policy is here assumed as objective 
public good, or overall public interest 
or non-exclusive common good. It 
is distinguished from and contrasts 
with the many competing partisan 
interests of a segment of society, 
formal institutions or of individuals in 
charge of public affairs in their different 
capacities. The rivalries of the many 
partisan interests at different levels 
that thrive in the public sphere may 
sometimes fuel a democratic response 
of distilling and advancing a common 
national interest out of the many. 
However, under certain circumstances, 
it may foster a logic of validating the 
institution of the practice of partisan 
loot and segmental interests as the 
contrived and convenient systemic 
operational protocol. 
The latter option would seem to 
be the road taken in most of Africa, 
including Nigeria. Corruption, in 
betraying the essential professional ethic 
of public administration, undermines 
the formulation and implementation 
of determined interests of the state 
or that of the national community. In 
defining and playing the crudest form 
of politics, implying literally who gets 
what and when by all means, including 
underhand, illegal and unconstitutional 
means, corruption lurks initially at the 
subterranean zone of engagements. 
This has, over time, become integral 
to the calculus of power and central 
to the negotiations to achieve the 
immediate political settlement in states 
characterised by fractious societies with 
neither a driving overarching central 
vision, a consensual moral centre nor 
even an agreed existential raison d'être 
of the state and polity. 
In these circumstances, state 
structures and institutions, both the 
corpus of protocols, procedures and 
the direct human articulators, have 
no direct philosophical directions. 
They may have often been captured 
by partisan forces to pursue goals 
extraneous to the overall public good. 
When this culture is entrenched in 
the political system, it impacts on 
the integrity of the formulation and 
implementation of policy, while 
undermining the integrity of structures 
and institutions of state governance. 
When corruption is believed to be 
the way the public sector, or one 
of its agencies, routinely operates 
the damage goes beyond the loss 
of misdirected resources; public 
administration risks losing both its 
capacity to be effective and the trust 
of citizens in the fair and impartial 
application of public resources and 
authority.4
Meanwhile, the informal terms of 
the management of the state space 
by a dominant coalition of forces or 
even intra institutional relations may 
entail certain informal agreements or 
informal mutual understandings that 
are inconsistent with the purity of the 
law, the Constitution or the overall 
public good. Such a development 
poses a danger to the continued 
integrity of the system as a whole. 
For it is a slippery slope. Political 
settlement is the forging of common 
understandings, usually between elites 
that their best interests or objectives are 
served by a particular way of organising 
and deploying of political power. Since 
every political settlement is temporary 
and implies informal elements in the 
extant settlement, the renegotiation of 
every new regime or evolved dominant 
coalition at all levels often involves a 
recalibration of the moral gauge that 
may or may not be close to the nation's 
moral centre. 
In the worst case scenario, the 
recalibration of the moral centre may 
also prove to be a political project 
not truly defined by public morality 
or ultimately by the search for the 
restitution of the public good from the 
parochial loot. The overall national 
ethical orientation is therefore critical 
in directing any assault on the Augean 
stable. In a May, 2017 report by 
Chatham House on Corruption in 
Nigeria, it is highlighted that while 
significant attention has been afforded 
to legal and institutional efforts to tackle 
corruption, little consideration thus 
far has been given to understanding 
and addressing corruption in Nigeria 
as a collective practice – one that is 
primarily an aggregate of individual 
behaviours that are sustained by 
particular beliefs and expectations.5
In Nigeria, the three branches 
of democratic governance have 
developed at one level, inter-
institutional antagonisms in response 
to the anti-corruption project of the 
Executive branch. This has been 
pronounced in the frosty relationship 
between the Presidency and the Senate 
over the refusal of the latter to confirm 
the appointment of Ibrahim Magu, 
whose implacable anti-corruption 
operations have been applauded 
by most Nigerians, as Chairman 
of Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC). Magu is generally 
perceived as a man with the zeal to 
cure Nigeria of the vice of corruption 
that has been plaguing the country.6 
Although Nigeria has a plethora of 
laws and institutions to fight corruption, 
the EFCC is the major anti-corruption 
instrument. Ibidolapo Bolu highlights 
that the major laws that deal with 
corruption in Nigeria are: 
• EFCC Establishment Act 2004. 
• Independent Corrupt Practices & 
Other Related Offences Act 200018 
• Advance Fee Fraud and Other 
Related Offences Act 200619 
• Money Laundering (Prohibition) 
(Amendment) Act 201220 
• Miscellaneous Offences Act 21 
• Code of Conduct Act 22 
• Nigerian Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative Act.
• Freedom of Information Act 201124 
• Fiscal Responsibilities Act 201025 
• Penal Code Laws of Federation of 
Nigeria 200426 
• Criminal Code Law of Federation of 
Nigeria 200427 
• Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions (Amendment) Act 1991 
• Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) 
and Financial Malpractices in Banks 
(Amendment) Act 199I. 7
In the face of being rejected twice by 
the Senate, the presidency announced 
its resolve to work with Ibrahim 
Magu as chairman of the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission to 
stamp out corruption in the country. 
Even while indisposed in London, the 
President reconfirmed the position that 
as long as he remained the President 
Ibrahim Magu would be the chairman 
of the EFCC. In a new twist to the 
confrontation of the two institutions, 
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the Presidency has insisted that Mr. 
Ibrahim Magu's nomination as the 
substantive Chairman of the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) does not belong to the category 
of executive appointment that requires 
Senate confirmation. The Presidency 
has filed a case with the Supreme 
Court for judicial interpretation of the 
relevant Section 171 of the Constitution 
on which it relied. 
For the Presidency, the Senate 
rejection of Magu is couched as 
corruption fighting back. The Senators 
are perceived to be against Magu 
because he has the corruption dossier 
on Senate President Bukola Saraki 
and several other serving Senators. 
It is also noted that Magu is about 
to re-commence the prosecution of 
former Delta Governor James Ibori 
who has just returned to the country 
from a British jail. Ibori is also seen as a 
close friend of Saraki and several other 
senators. Meanwhile, the Senators 
asserted in a note to the public that 
based on available security reports, 
the Senate could not proceed with 
confirmation of Ibrahim Magu as 
the Chairman of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission. They 
spoke, paradoxically, of a failure of 
an integrity test by the nominated 
Chairman. The nomination of Ibrahim 
Magu was hereby rejected and has 
been returned to the President for 
further action.8 
The case of the Legislature against 
Magu has not been helped by the 
introduction of a bill largely understood 
to grant amnesty to corrupt officials. The 
bill reads: A Bill for an Act to Establish 
a Scheme to Harness untaxed Money 
for Investment Purposes and to assure 
any Declarant Regarding Inquiries and 
Proceedings under Nigerian Law and 
for other Matters Concerned Therewith. 
In public reaction to the bill, The 
Ummah Movement under the National 
Islamic Centre (NIC), has condemned 
the bill before the National Assembly 
as seeking to grant amnesty to treasury 
looters. The Ummah Movement 
rejected the spurious and self-serving 
reasons for the bill and urged all 
Nigerians of good will to condemn it 
and the National Assembly to abandon 
and cancel its second reading.
At another level, the fight 
against corruption has elicited intra 
institutional tensions mainly in the 
Nigerian Bar Association, whose more 
radical members have lashed out at 
the Bar Association (NBA) for shielding 
corrupt judges  and teaming up with 
corrupt judges and corrupt members 
of the Legislatures to frustrate the 
Executive's anti-corruption campaign. 
In this connection, some bar members 
noted that in particular, the Nigerian 
Bar Association, which has information 
on all corrupt judges and lawyers in the 
country, has continued to shield them 
to the embarrassment of incorruptible 
members of the bar and the bench. It 
was highlighted that the few lawyers 
who have plucked up the courage to 
expose corrupt judges and lawyers 
have been stigmatised and treated like 
lepers by their colleagues. It was noted 
that it is on record that when both 
the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and other Offences Commission and 
the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission sent invitation letters 
to judges suspected of corruption, 
the judges had rushed to the Federal 
High Court to obtain interlocutory 
injunctions to prevent their arrest, 
investigation and prosecution.9
Meanwhile, the Executive also 
has a fair share of egregiously corrupt 
elements.  
Yet the evidence suggests a lack of 
a common ethical pole in the brutish 
struggles to appropriate the totality of 
the public space by partisan actors. 
The restitution of the sanity of the 
public space entails a process without 
safeguards. This is specially so in multi-
national societies with fragmented, 
fractious and competitive intra-national 
society associated with little integrated 
social capital for the process to draw 
on.  Yet, often the project to recalibrate 
or reaffirm the centrality of the national 
moral centre may however be a ruse; 
an exercise merely promulgated as a 
convenient tool for regime validation 
and consolidation of power. Because 
of this possibility, the management of 
corruption thus spans two poles. It may 
be a legitimate project of sanitising the 
public sphere; or at the other end may 
be a mere political project of partisan 
consolidation of power. Whatever 
drives the project though, it is a political 
process that is subject and vulnerable 
to the unpredictability and vagaries 
of politics. The politics of the process 
to mitigate corruption is therefore 
a critical imperative. In general, 
perpetrators of corruption often seek 
to turn the restitution and criminal 
process into a political charade. At least 
that has been the tendency in the anti-
corruption campaign in Nigeria.
The dominant regime at each point 
in time refers to the rules, principles, 
norms and modes on interaction 
between social groups and state 
organs. Corruption is perceived as part 
of exploiting opportunities based on 
rational calculus of costs and benefits. 
Rose-Ackerman and Søreide advance 
that in economic terms, for instance, 
corruption is usually opportunistic 
behaviour based on rational choice 
and agency theory, and thus on the 
individual’s motivations for engaging in 
corrupt behaviour.10 
In this context, the directing 
principles of corruption driven regimes 
is the perpetuation of illegal and unfair 
distribution of value inconsistent 
with the organic law of the land. The 
public sector is then deployed to serve 
private, sectional and partisan ends. In 
any case, the public sector may lose its 
pre-eminence as the main structure for 
the developmental agenda as proceeds 
from corruption in private hands 
outstrip what is officially allocated 
to public administration. In Nigeria, 
the Minister of Information, National 
Orientation and Culture, Alhaji Lai 
Mohammed, revealed that the looters 
of the public treasury had more money 
in their possession than all the tiers 
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of government in the country. The 
Minister was quoted as saying it is now 
obvious that there are more funds in the 
possession of looters than are available 
to government at all levels to meet their 
obligations, including paying workers' 
salaries, providing social amenities, 
upgrading infrastructure and ensuring 
the security of lives and property.11 
Meanwhile, it has been estimated 
that close to $400 billion was stolen 
from Nigeria’s public accounts from 
1960 to 1999. Also, between 2005 and 
2014, $182 billion was lost through 
illicit financial flows from the country.11 
In light of daily revelations of stolen 
public money in Nigeria, some may 
consider the Chatham House estimate 
rather conservative.
Corruption expresses itself in a 
multitude of ways. The final impact 
however is the gross distortion and 
derailment of established procedures, 
processes and protocols that define the 
nature and character of national and 
societal systems; of the relationships, 
operations and ethos of the public 
sphere. These distortions impact 
in the subversion of the integrity of 
all facets of national life: political, 
including administrative, legislative 
and the judiciary; economic; social; 
cultural; normative; and spiritual. In 
contrast to the search for the public 
and common good, corruption at the 
personal, societal and institutional 
levels advances the subjective, private 
and parochial interests of a few to the 
detriment of the objective interests of 
the overall collectivity. In fiscal terms, it 
promotes parochial loot at the expense 
of the public good. It also reflects a lack 
of or corrosion of the moral centre of 
society while polluting, metaphorically 
and in actuality, the spirituality of 
the public space and entire fabric of 
the febrile community. At its worst, 
corruption shreds the conventional 
operative norms of society and drives 
all levels of the subverted interactions 
of a society in decay.
The physical expressions of 
corruption range from the ridiculous 
to the bizarre. Tayo Oke shares that 
Politically Exposed Persons in Nigeria 
and across the continent appear to 
have come up with ingenious means 
of concealing their stolen wealth. 
In January 2017 he documents 
that, for instance, Kenya's Electricity 
Corporation, "Kenya Power", recovered 
18 transformers buried in a farmland 
by a top government functionary. Also, 
in January this year, after spending 
his stolen wealth until he became 
terminally ill, a Ugandan man instructed 
his wife to bury him with $55,000 US 
dollars, apparently for use to bribe God 
(just in case the Almighty turns out 
to be a Ugandan like him). Recently, 
in Nigeria, seven military Hilux 
trucks were needed to dig up N37bn 
concealed in farmland. A prosecution 
witness in the ongoing trial of Andrew 
Yakubu told the Federal High Court, 
Abuja, how 9.8m dollars and £74,000 
was found in the defendant’s house in 
Kaduna. Yakubu, who was the former 
Group Managing Director (GMD) 
of the Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), was arraigned 
by the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) on a six-count 
charge of money laundering and false 
asset declaration. 
Stories abound of monies being 
abandoned at airports, hidden in 
sewage outlets, in rooftops, swimming 
pool hatches, graveyards, etc. Some 
of the affected PEPs have stolen more 
money than they and their generations 
yet unborn can ever need or require.12 
Yet, this is only the tip of the iceberg. 
Premier state institutions, including 
the Legislature and Judiciary are not 
immune to the challenge. 
In the early hours of Saturday, 
October 8, Directorate of State 
Services (DSS) operatives launched a 
sting operation in several parts of the 
country. Justices of the Supreme Court 
Sylvester Ngwuta and John Okoro 
were taken to the EFCC in custody. 
Justice Ngwuta allegedly traveled to 
Qatar to receive a bribe which he 
shared with Justice Okoro and others. 
The bribe was allegedly for Governor 
Wike to win his election case which 
got to the Supreme Court. When 
Justice Ngwunta’s house was raided, 
the DSS allegedly recovered N35,208 
million, U$319,475, £25,890 and 
€280. Ngwuta is being prosecuted 
by the federal government on a 
16-count charge for corruption, money 
laundering and other financial crimes. 
He has however pleaded not guilty to 
the charges and was granted bail on 
self-recognition. 
When the DSS stormed the 
residence of another Justice, Adeniyi 
Ademola, he was arrested allegedly 
with N54 million cash, $171,779, 
€4,400 Euros, 1,010 Rupees, and £80 
in his possession. Subsequently, a High 
Court in Abuja cleared Justice Adeniyi 
Ademola and his wife, Olabowale, of 
charges of corruption brought against 
them by the Attorney General of 
the Federation. A statement by the 
presidency indicated that the federal 
government has filed an appeal against 
the ruling which discharged a Federal 
High Court judge and two others of 
fraud allegations. In the statement, 
the federal government reiterated its 
determination to save the war against 
corruption. This followed a streak of 
losses in the courts. Accordingly, it 
filed an appeal against the decision of 
Justice Jude Okeke to uphold the no 
case submission in the corruption case 
against Justice Adeniyi Ademola, Mrs. 
Olabowale Ademola and Mr. Joe Agi, 
SAN. The Government through the 
Ministry of Justice has also filed a fresh 
case in the Code of Conduct Tribunal 
against Justice Ademola and wife for 
living above their means and failure to 
declare their assets,” the sources were 
quoted as saying.13 
In another raid of the residence of 
a judge, Justice Okoro was found with 
N4.35 million, $38,833 and €1000 
Euros.14  In another high profile case 
involving the Judiciary and a member 
of the Nigerian Bar, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
arraigned Justice Ofili-Ajumogobia 
alongside Mr. Godwin Obla, a 
Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), on 
November 28, 2016 on a 30-count 
charge bordering on conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice, offering 
gratification to a public official, and 
unlawful enrichment by a public 
official, among others.
Meanwhile, the Vanguard 
newspaper (Nigeria) reports that the 
House of Representatives has queried 
the Central Bank of Nigeria for a 
staggering $81.2bn imbalance in crude 
oil sale proceeds declared by the apex 
bank for the years 2011 to 2014. The 
query was sent to the CBN by the 
House ad hoc committee investigating 
the alleged export of $17bn undeclared 
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crude and gas resources from the 
country between 2011 and 2014. Part 
of the query the committee sent to the 
apex bank read, "That out of $42.7bn 
you declared as crude oil sales receipt, 
that $35.2bn, representing 82.4 per 
cent, went into a bottomless pit called 
Cash Call and Excess Crude Account, 
and only $7.5bn, representing 17.6 per 
cent, was available for distribution to 
the three tiers of government."15
The entrenchment of legalised and 
institutionalised systemic looting of 
the state is revealed in the struggles 
of the Socio-Economic Rights and 
Accountability Project (SERAP) to 
recover more than N40 billion received 
by ex-governors of some of Nigeria's 
36 states, currently serving as senators 
and in the federal cabinet as ministers. 
The SERAP noted that the politicians 
were already enjoying pensions and 
other privileges and ought not to 
receive further emoluments from the 
Federal Government. Accordingly, 
the SERAP dispatched a letter to the 
Attorney-General of the Federation 
and Minister of Justice to urgently 
institute appropriate legal actions to 
challenge the legality of states’ laws 
permitting former governors currently 
serving as senators and ministers to 
enjoy monumental serving governors’ 
emoluments as pensions. In its letter 
to the AGF, the organisation expressed 
concern that many serving senators 
and ministers were receiving salaries 
and life pensions running into billions 
of naira from states that were currently 
unwilling or unable to pay workers’ 
salaries. It said that double emolument 
and large severance benefits for former 
governors now serving as public 
officials constituted a blatant betrayal 
of public trust. 
Publishing a survey of the pensions 
and privileges many governors had 
approved for themselves with the 
connivance of their cronies in state 
Legislatures, SERAP noted that under 
the Lagos (State) Pension Law, a 
former governor would enjoy the 
following benefits for life: Two houses, 
one in Lagos and another in Abuja 
estimated to cost between N500m 
and N700m. It said they also enjoy six 
brand new cars, furniture allowance 
of 300 per cent of annual salary to be 
paid every two years, and a close to 
N2.5m monthly pension (about N30m 
pension annually).
It said a former governor of Lagos 
State was also entitled to free medicals 
with his immediate families as well as 
house maintenance, car maintenance, 
entertainment and utility allowances in 
addition to several domestic staff. In 
Rivers State, the law provided for 100 
per cent of annual basic salaries for 
ex-governor and deputy, one residential 
house for former governor anywhere of 
his choice and one residential house for 
the deputy for life. Three cars are given 
to the ex-governor every four years; 
two cars for the deputy, 300 per cent 
of annual basic salary for furniture; and 
10 percent of annual basic salary for 
house maintenance.
In Akwa Ibom State, the law 
provided N200m annual pay to ex 
governors, deputies; pension for life 
at a rate equivalent to the salary of the 
incumbent governor/deputy governor 
respectively. A new official car and 
utility-vehicle, one personal aide 
and provision of adequate security; a 
cook, chauffeurs and security guards 
were provided for the governor. Other 
benefits include free medical services 
for governor and spouse at an amount 
not exceeding N100m for the governor 
per annum and N50m for the deputy 
governor. The law also gave a five-
bedroom mansion and allowance of 
300 percent of annual basic salary 
for the deputy governor; 300 percent 
of annual basic salary and severance 
gratuity.
The Kano State Pension Rights 
of Governor and Deputy Governor 
provided for 100 percent of annual 
basic salaries for former governor 
and deputy as well as furnished and 
equipped offices. It also provided for 
a 6-bedroom house; well-furnished 
4-bedroom for deputy, plus an office; 
free medical treatment for self and 
immediate families, two drivers; and a 
provision for a 30- day vacation within 
and outside Nigeria.
It said Gombe State law gave N300 
million executive pension benefits 
for the ex-governors while Kwara law 
gave a former governor two cars and 
a security car replaceable every three 
years. The act also provided for a well-
furnished 5-bedroom duplex, 300 per 
cent of his salary as furniture allowance 
and five personal staff. The ex-governor 
and his deputy are  also entitled to free 
medical care, 30 per cent of salary 
for car maintenance,  20 per cent for 
utility, 10 per cent for entertainment; 
10 per cent for house maintenance. 
SERAP said in Zamfara State, 
former governors received pension for 
life, two personal staff, two vehicles 
replaceable, two drivers and free 
medical treatment for them and their 
immediate families in Nigeria or 
abroad. Ex-governors in the state are 
also entitled to a 4-bedroom house in 
Zamfara, an office, free telephone and 
30 days paid vacation outside Nigeria. 
The Sokoto State law gave former 
governors and deputy governors N200 
million and N180million respectively 
being payment for other entitlements 
which included domestic aides, 
residence and vehicles that could be 
renewed after every four years. Many 
of the beneficiaries of the appropriated 
largesse are serving either in the Senate 
or appointed into the federal cabinet 
who, at the same time, were receiving 
equally monumental salaries and 
privileges.16
Also  in a case involving corporations 
with state agencies, media reports that 
George Turnah, holder of a privileged 
title of Member of the Order of Niger, 
MON, together with seven companies, 
were arraigned on a 12-count charge 
bordering on obtaining by false 
pretense, money laundering and abuse 
of office to the tune of N3, 094, 268, 
235.69.The seven companies arraigned 
with Turnah are: El Godmas Global 
Services Limited; Turnoil and Gas 
Nigeria Limited; Kolo Creek Petroleum 
Development Limited; Celtic Pride 
Consult and Events; Yenagoa Mall, 
Adaka Boro Marine Services Limited 
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and Sugarland Integrated farms Nigeria 
Limited.17
Corruption seems to be inherent in 
the very nature of power in developing 
societies. The intense unmediated 
struggle for acquisition of power by 
all means by all the various competing 
individuals and their convenient roles 
as part of the coalescing partisan 
forces have proven to the most cost 
effective instrument to escape grinding 
poverty, achieve and consolidate the 
social mobility of individuals and their 
immediate families. Subsequently is 
the proclivity to abuse public trust 
in promoting personal or sectional 
interests. Power usurpation, including 
very skewed patterns in the distribution 
of fiscal value either through truncated 
due processes in politics, business 
and economic interaction or even the 
subversion of spirituality, is therefore 
the norm in state spaces characterised 
by intense struggle for partisan 
appropriation. Corruption is clearly 
associated with the power calculus in 
state spaces and societies floundering 
with no validating principles. It is what 
defines who is in and who is out. He 
who dares, wins. 
The public sphere is a murky 
realm where angels fear to tread. 
It is paramount that the complete 
denudation of the ethics of the public 
space and the criminal abridgement of 
normal processes by representatives of 
stake-holding constituents in national 
affairs are tacitly or even explicitly 
approved by partisan kinsmen and the 
local constituency. The latter perceive 
themselves as direct or potential 
beneficiaries of the accruing and 
accrued loot of the local hero operating 
at their instance at the centre of power. 
The local hero who is villainous at the 
national level is often further rewarded 
by the local community for his villainous 
acts of corruption at the centre. They 
often represent the communal wild 
dogs that are unleashed to haunt, 
hunt and hound in the wild world of 
domestic politics of prebendal systems. 
This behavioural attitude may 
be consistent with the treatise of 
organisational scholars, (cited by 
Ashforth and Anand, 2003) that have 
emphasised that corruption should not 
only be regarded as a state of misuse, 
but also as a process – ie a gradual 
institutionalisation of misbehaviour 
which contributes to legitimising 
behaviour and socialising others into it 
in such a way that it gradually becomes 
normalised. This may be called a 
‘culture of corruption’).18
The local heroes must also ensure 
that no new heroes emerge in the local 
community. So the dominant heroes 
of the community share the largess in 
a local patrimonial paradigm built on 
loyalty to their persons. In most cases, 
emerging challengers are physically 
eliminated. This ensures that the circle 
of political elites is very narrow and on 
the surface uncompetitive. 
Tayo Oke is miffed by the obsession 
with money by public officials? And, if 
that sounded baffling, then, Oke asked, 
by way of analogy, why politicians in 
this country (Nigeria) never retire from 
the 'business' of politics? They move 
from being secretary to a governor, 
then become a two-term governor in 
their own right, move to the Senate to 
serve two or three terms, move on to 
become a minister, and then, move 
on to become Chairman, Board of 
Trustees of their party, etc. 
The departing president or governor 
handpicks a sympathiser or a protégé of 
sorts as his successor to protect his back 
once out of office. He acquires the 
status of a political godfather of sorts in 
the community. The attempt to protect 
dubious legacies of outgoing regimes, 
and in most cases with skeletons 
in huge cupboards to conceal, is 
integral to the perpetuation of political 
corruption. The immutable trajectory 
of this is part of the arrangement to 
perpetuate corruption. It is corruption 
of the political and economic space 
fossilised in the subsisting political 
settlement.
Part of the corruption of the political 
space is the expected assurance that 
the next administration will protect the 
last. This has often been the case where 
the "new" in-coming administration 
has been put together by the outgoing 
governor. That has implied the 
truncation of internal democracy 
within the political parties and by 
implication of the national democracy 
project. The situation in Lagos State of 
Nigeria is a prime example. Against this 
background, elections at all levels are 
therefore sham as each regime seeks 
to perpetuate itself in a second term, 
whether it has earned it by meritorious 
performance in the  first term or not. If 
it is constitutionally barred and cannot 
elongate its rule, the next option 
to ensure continuity of the extant 
political settlement is through electoral 
fraud. The elections must throw up a 
new government of its cronies from 
its ruling party. Accordingly, in a 
nominally democratic environment, it 
is the judiciary that often determines 
the winner. Cases have been known 
to languish in the courts half way into 
the gubernatorial mandate only to 
declare the governor an usurper. In 
this climate, the sages stay at home. 
Corruption is institutionalised.
Therefore while corruption may be 
instigated primarily for personal gain of 
the individual perpetrator, it is often 
instrumental in promoting, providing 
and satiating parochial material or 
psychological dividends of a sub-set of 
the national community or a defined 
parochial constituency. This delineated 
partisan constituency perceives that 
its interests are served by acts of 
the villainous representative at the 
national level, who is hailed as a smart 
hero in the home constituencies. The 
denunciations at the national level are 
contrasted by the approbations at the 
home constituency of the perceived 
smart local heroes. This suggests a wide 
ethical discrepancy across the field and 
gargantuan systemic value dissonance 
in the operational axioms underpinning 
the system as a whole. This wide gap 
directs the operative expectations at 
the local level for their representatives 
deployed to the centre.  
This is often the case in multi-
national states and societies struggling 
with the damaging deficits and 
imperatives of state orphanage in post-
colonial contexts and the challenges of 
nation building. This has emerged even 
in post-liberation state spaces with 
relatively more coherent ideological 
appreciations of the essences of 
the state forged out of the crucible 
of horrendous deprivations and 
revolutionary struggles. They constitute 
post-revolutionary societies in decay 
as the tenets of the revolution have 
given way to the banalities of partisan 
struggles intrinsic to the formulation 
of political settlements outside the 
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strictures of the ideologically driven 
party directions.
Corruption is manifest in 
bribery, misappropriation, underhand 
transactional processes outside the 
established due process, and all 
other related forms of non-material 
gratifications, including demands for 
and solicited and willful offering of 
sexual favours, as well as stealing of 
public funds. Corruption includes the 
use of otherwise legitimate institutional 
mandates, such as the Legislature or a 
political party, to orient the formulation 
of public policy away from the objective 
public interest in the direction of 
outcomes for private dividends and or 
parochial gains. Also, corruption may 
entail the implementation of policy in 
a manner that detracts from the overall 
public good to advance parochial 
interests of the direct recipients, their 
complicit constituencies or institutional 
actors. Institutions, including political 
parties and state organs such as the 
Executive, the Legislature or even the 
Judiciary, can therefore be corrupt.  
Despite popular understanding 
of corruption as the outcome of 
clandestine interaction between 
individual actors, corruption often 
entails open interactions based on 
or implied tacit public partnerships. 
Partisan state capture and the 
corruption of the state space begin 
with electoral fraud.
Systemic corruption threatens 
democracy and good governance in 
Nigeria. The country’s senate president 
stood trial for false asset declaration 
and other corruption-related charges. 
Many former governors are facing trial 
for graft. The Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) is actively 
investigating dozens more sitting and 
former officials. News that several 
senior election officials allegedly 
accepted millions of dollars in bribes 
demonstrates that corruption threatens 
the integrity and credibility of Nigeria’s 
elections.19
The logic of systematic and 
systematised corruption is founded 
in its utilitarian function as a political 
instrument and as an organic, even 
if illegitimate, glue to a negotiated 
political settlement among like-minded 
corruption directed dominant elites. 
The national project in this case rests 
on a permanently fragile political 
settlement that incorporates in an 
atomistic fashion, in contradistinction 
from an integrated manner, the 
collectivity of prominent national 
villains who are legitimated in their 
local constituencies by virtue of their 
capacity to advance a parochial loot at 
the national level. 
The national villain is thus validated 
by his credentials as a local hero. 
There is therefore no consensual 
moral centre to prosecute the pre-
eminent local heroes advancing the 
partisan interests as a national villain. 
Impunity results from the character 
of the national processes founded 
on a political settlement based on 
discounted national values and ethics. 
Impunity reduces the perceived cost 
of corruption. As former Chief Justice 
of Nigeria, Justice Dahiru Musdapha, 
observed in a keynote address at the 
SERAP’s 9th Roundtable conference 
in 2012, the risk that corrupt activities 
will result in imprisonment and 
accompanying public humiliation 
is minimal. He surmised that the 
gains of corruption are therefore not 
discounted and there is thus, little 
reason beyond personal integrity not to 
engage in corrupt acts.
Corruption is thus a complex 
phenomenon entailing an equally 
complicated network of actors 
internally and externally. That 
complexity also involves understanding 
the structural linkages of domestic 
level national villains in the context 
of a subsisting political settlement 
while simultaneously defining the 
relationships of local proxies with 
their conniving external hegemonic 
state and institutional collaborators. 
The internal political settlements that 
validate corruption at the highest levels 
in less developed political systems are 
also integral to formal and informal 
engagements with external interests 
and partners as informal state policy in 
pursuit of their sovereign interests. 
Corruption in African countries 
can therefore be analysed at two 
levels. At the first level is the anatomy 
of corruption in the domestic and 
national setting. At the second level 
is the nature of the murky external 
environment, political and legal, that 
facilitates corruption in, paradoxically, 
a reversed  structural dependence 
of powerful international forces on 
corruption in underdeveloped political 
systems in the Southern hemisphere 
to oil their respective economic and 
political machineries.
Corruption, especially endemic 
across all strata of society and national 
communities in Africa, is the most 
expressive public articulation of 
an upended ethical and normative 
system and a deformed spirituality 
of the community. This may lead to 
psychological mass defection from 
the idea of the centrality of the state 
as the defining political realm or of the 
notion of the nation as a determinate 
community. In this context, 
statesmanship is reduced to activities 
to exploit the subject putative state, 
the nation and community. Notions 
of the rhetorical national project, like 
the character of the concrete myth of 
these kind of states, acquire a fictive 
character in what essentially are entities 
that perpetually struggle to consolidate 
themselves as concrete and legitimate 
realities.
The struggles for the absolute 
partisan appropriation of the totality of 
the state space by individuals such as 
Sassou Nguesso in Congo Brazzaville 
and Obiang in Equatorial Guinea, 
account for the significant incidence 
of corruption in the post-colonial 
state. Corruption is thus integral to 
the process of and struggle for partisan 
appropriation of state spaces unleashed 
by the unconsolidated and unpacified 
nature of the state and potential nation 
spaces in their post-colonial settings. 
In fact, the dominant governance 
paradigms in post-colonial or post-
liberation entities rest on corruption. 
This is abundantly manifest whether 
in the context of the many derailed 
messianic military interventions or 
intrusions in public life that predictably 
ended up spawning moral monstrosities 
governing through opaque and 
unaccountable standard operating 
procedures in regimes of bold thieves 
in uniforms or even in the post military 
ex-military dominated successive 
odious instrumental democracies 
exemplified by Nigeria. 
They are also manifest elsewhere in 
patrimonial administrations in One Man 
States (OMS) as in Obiang's Equatorial 
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Guinea or Togo under the Gbasingbe 
Eyadema and his dynasty or One 
Party States in Angola's MPLA (OPS). 
In the post-Cold War era associated 
with enhanced cognitive sensibilities 
in relation to governance in the global 
environment and the associated 
demands for transformational 
democratic leadership, corruption 
remains endemic in neo-patrimonial 
systems in the post One Man State 
or post One Party States or even 
represented in the emerged post-
revolutionary decay of post liberation 
and post settlement regimes depicted 
by South Africa, Zimbabwe, Guinea 
Bissau and Angola.
Meanwhile, in spite of the political 
rhetoric to the contrary, corruption 
has been an explicit vehicle for the 
promotion of continued hegemonic 
statuses of neo-imperial partners 
of predatory national leaderships 
serving in proxy roles. This seeming 
validation of international amorality 
in the affairs of poor and weak 
countries shaped the consciousness 
and understandings of local third 
world tyrants of the duplicitous state 
of global morality. Corruption was also 
then a strategic instrument for political 
longevity domestically and in oiling 
the international crucial partnership 
externally.  These understandings 
underpinned  the workings of a curious 
international network and structural 
linkages of global corruption. These 
networks can be plainly public as in the 
historic case of FrançAfrique.
FrançAfrique symbolises everything 
nebulous about French neo-colonial 
relationship with post-independence 
Francophone Africa that meant keeping 
former colonies on a tight leash. This is 
expressed in political interference to 
protect France's political and economic 
interests: organised coups to remove 
African leaders that attempted to go 
rogue, covert military intervention 
to secure natural resources; and 
corruption and illicit outflows.
Corruption thus feeds into and 
is sustained by the amorality of 
the operations of the international 
system. The leaders of elite states 
adumbrate their political correctness in 
condemning corruption while turning a 
blind eye to institutional collaboration 
with corruption in their proxy 
states. This is to the benefits of their 
economies or to the private fortunes of 
selected families in the metropoles. In 
fact formal neo-colonial relationships 
are founded on the transference 
through legal and formal compacts as 
well as illegal channels oiled by formal 
state institutions of receiving powers 
of illegally acquired wealth to the 
metropoles. It is the standard modus 
operandi of FrançAfrique in Africa.
The quid pro quo is that the corrupt 
and the conniving African head of state 
and the cohort in the inner circles of the 
patrimonial arrangement are protected 
in office and assured a life-time reign. 
The most loyal of these corrupt proxies 
may be offered French honorific titles 
such as the Houphouet Boigny Prize 
for peace instituted in the name of 
the life President of that country. 
The honorifics are to deodorise their 
memories and whitewash their real 
role in blighting the fortunes of their 
nations. Blackmail is a tool in the box. 
Where through dynastic succession, 
the scions of established corrupt 
leaderships seek to break the mould 
and renounce consolidated patterns 
of fiscal hemorrhage of the treasury to 
external destinations such as France as 
in the case of Ali Bongo, the son and 
successor of the late Omar Bongo of 
Gabon, they are blackmailed to return 
to the status quo. The cases of Laurent 
and Simone Gbagbo who refused to 
continue the tradition of unlimited and 
mediated access of France to the Ivorian 
treasury under Houphouet Boigny in 
Cote d'Ivoire are clear examples. So 
is that of President Pascal Lissouba in 
Congo Brazzaville, who opened up 
the strategic, even if puny, oil sector 
of the economy to foreign, specifically 
American, participation. In both 
cases, the responsible French agency 
concocted narratives demonising them 
as blackmail to soften the ground 
before their final political executions. 
French companies and establishments 
are in partnership with the state in 
the execution of these critical national 
projects.
In Congo (Brazzaville) Elf Acquitane 
financed a war to bring back Sassou 
Nguesso to power to facilitate 
continued French control of the 
economy. Corruption thus becomes an 
instrument for neocolonial domination 
and control.  Meanwhile, the situation 
can sometimes be complicated. With 
the election of Donald Trump as 
President of the United States, Sassou 
Nguesso is haunted by his past. Sassou 
Nguesso is enmeshed in corruption 
scandals in Australia, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. 
Earlier this year, during trips to 
Washington, Sassou Nguesso’s wife, 
son, and finance minister were served 
with subpoenas, which required them 
to disclose the sources and locations of 
Sassou Nguesso’s wealth. As Brent L. 
Carlson highlights, the subpoenas were 
delivered as part of Commisimpex SA’s 
effort to collect a $1 billion arbitration 
award, which stemmed from Sassou 
Nguesso’s refusal to pay infrastructure 
invoices some 30 years ago. Sassou 
Nguesso’s routine use of official 
meetings with French presidents to 
elicit guarantees of immunity from 
prosecution20 is not enough, given the 
new realities at the international level. 
It can be recalled that in the 
1980s ELF Acquitane funded the 
war unleashed by Sassou Nguesso 
to overthrow democratically elected 
Congolese President Pascal Lissouba 
from office. Thereafter, from the late 
1980s, Sassou Nguesso, a major player 
in the FrançAfrique network, favoured 
France to undercut ExxonMobil's 
central role in offshore exploration in 
that country. Sassou Nguesso stripped 
ExxonMobil of oil concessions granted 
to the American company under 
President Pascal Lissouba. He awarded 
the most lucrative production permits 
to French corporations Elf and Total 
– essentially snubbing ExxonMobil. In 
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the context of the prevailing political 
realities, especially Sassou Nguesso’s 
protracted centrality in FrançAfrique 
corruption networks, his decision then 
was politically prudent. As a result, 
from the late 1980s Sassou Nguesso 
has had a strained relationship with 
ExxonMobil, and its fomer CEO Rex 
Tillerson. 
In 2017, however, Tillerson is 
President Trump’s Secretary of state. 
Nguesso is thus seeking rapprochement 
with Tillerson and assurance from 
President Donald Trump. Finally, in 
2015, Sassou Nguesso gained the 
implicit approval of French President 
Francois Hollande’s to illegally review 
the Congolese Constitution to enable 
him to stand for a re-election not 
prescribed in the constitution in March 
2016. Many protesting this illegality in 
the streets were killed. Sassou Nguesso 
is again suppressing a phantom 
opposition in a military campaign in 
the Pool region. The military campaign 
ostensibly targets a rebel group that no 
longer exists. In reality, the campaign 
is designed to threaten citizens who 
might otherwise contest and protest his 
fraudulent “reelection.”21
Also, Joseph Desire Mobutu, 
President of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo from 1965 until his 
death from prostate cancer in 1997 
is documented as setting about a 
systematic plundering of one of the 
richest countries on earth. He stole 
and stashed away a whopping $30bn 
in Western banks, notably, in France 
and Switzerland.22 Former maximum 
ruler and dictator Sani Abacha stashed 
way over 5 billion United States dollars 
in safe havens, including the United 
States, Switzerland, France, Luxemburg 
and various established destinations of 
stolen wealth from Africa. Negotiations 
to repatriate the stolen loot have 
remained tortuous.
It is against the background of the 
international dimensions of corruption 
that the Nigerian administration has 
entered into bilateral agreements 
with a number of countries that have 
provided safe havens for stolen monies 
from Nigeria. On January 19, 2016, 
Nigeria signed six agreements with the 
United Arab Emirates, following a state 
visit by President Muhammadu Buhari. 
The pact includes Judicial Agreements 
on Extradition, Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons, Mutual Legal Assistance on 
Criminal Matters, and Mutual Legal 
Assistance on Criminal and Commercial 
Matters (the recovery and repatriation 
of stolen wealth). In September, 
2016, the Federal Government of 
Nigeria signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the British 
Government on the modalities for the 
return of Nigerian stolen assets. 
The Attorney-General of the 
Federation, Abubakar Malami, who 
signed on behalf of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria, outlined the 
objectives of the MoU. It includes the 
fact that the processes of returning 
stolen assets was a partnership to 
further the interest of both countries 
and based on mutual understanding, 
confidence and trust. That both 
countries recognised that they have 
a mutual interest in ensuring that 
returned assets are not at risk of 
being misappropriated again. And 
that both countries recognised they 
have obligations toward their own 
citizens for providing such assurances. 
Also, both countries recognised the 
importance of ensuring that the highest 
possible standard of transparency 
and accountability are applied for 
the return of assets. The Nigerian 
Attorney General gave the assurance 
to the international community that all 
funds recovered would be judiciously 
utilised for projects that would benefit 
the poorest segment of the Nigerian 
society.23 Affirming his government's 
full commitment to the return of all 
funds looted from the Nigeria,  the 
Minister of State for Immigration of 
the United Kingdom, Robert Goodwill, 
announced that 40 jurisdictions, 
including British Overseas Territories, 
would share beneficial ownership 
information relating to companies, 
trusts and foundations in order to 
expose owners of stolen assets.
Before then, a two day Anti 
Corruption Summit was held in London 
that brought together over 40 heads of 
government to use the conference to 
galvanise a global response to tackle 
corruption. It was expected that 
agreement would be reached on the 
repatriation or extradition of persons 
that had looted their nation’s funds to 
ensure they faced trial.
It was also hoped that the summit 
would remove all impediments to the 
efforts of the Nigerian President to get 
all stolen money in the UK repatriated. 
At last, it will be faster to facilitate 
the repatriation of the assets that are 
abroad; and even the people behind 
the looting living abroad could be 
extradited to Nigeria. ■
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